

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 295057  
ORIGIN EUR-12

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DRAFTED BY EUR/RPE:WHDAMERON:CS  
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R 100153Z DEC 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BERN  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 295057

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC, GENVEA ALSO FOR USMTN USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EGEN, ECIN, XH

SUBJECT: NORTH-SOUTH STRATEGIES

REF: MOSCOW 12331

REFERENCED MESSAGE IS REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P R 250635Z AUG 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1345  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA, AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR, AMEMBASSY  
LAGOS, AMEMBASSY LA PAZ, AMEMBASSY LUSAKA, AMEMBASSY MEXICO,  
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AMEMBASSY ROME, AMEMBASSY TEHRAN, AMEMBASSY TOKYO.

FOR S/P LAKE

E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: EGEN, ECIN  
SUBJECT: NORTH-SOUTH STRATEGIES

REF: STATE 191928

SUMMARY: WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE COULD IDEALLY BE  
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CONSIDERABLE VALUE IN ELICITING A GENUINE SOVIET CONTRIBU-  
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WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR OWN STAKE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC  
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ON THE OTHER HAND, WE REGARD IT AS POSSIBLE TO USE THE  
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WHEN WE PROPOSED SUCH A PROJECT EARLIER THIS YEAR TO THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF HEALTH, BUT THERE ARE SOME IDENTIFIABLE FIELDS WHERE A JOINT EFFORT COULD AT LEAST BE DISCUSSED.

IN THOSE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE PARTICIPATING BUT ARE CREATING OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE ACTION - FOR EXAMPLE, THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM - WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY WOULD BE TO WORK THROUGH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

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USSR, EITHER BILATERALLY OR IN MULTILATERAL FORA TO IMPROVE THEIR PERFORMANCE. END SUMMARY.

1. SOVIET THINKING TOWARDS THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP AND POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THEY ARE NOT NOW REPRESENTED IS CONSERVATIVE IN THE SENSE OF MINIMIZING ANY CONCEIVABLE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE USSR OR OF INTRODUCING ANY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM ITSELF. AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIETS SEE THEMSELVES AS COMPETITORS WITH THE WEST IN THE THIRD WORLD, SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE DISSATISFACTION OR DISTRESS OF THE LATTER TO SOVIET NATIONAL ADVANTAGE AND PARTICULARLY TO THE EXTENSION OR ENHANCEMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THOSE AREAS. WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET THINKING MAY BEST BE ANALYZED IF SUBDIVIDED INTO ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN AID, MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

2. SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN MADE CLEAR AND PROBABLY WILL BE RESTATED IN DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE AT NEXT REGULAR SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ESSENTIALLY SOVIET DOCTRINE IS THAT THE DISTRESS OF THE THIRD WORLD STEMS FROM COLONIALISM AND CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION AND IS NO PROPER BURDEN, MORAL OR OTHERWISE, OF USSR AND ITS "SOCIALIST" ALLIES. IN FACT, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS LIKE TO DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS POOR BOY WHO BECAME A GIANT, THEY ALSO PLAY SLIGHTLY DISCORDANT THEME THAT USSR NEEDS EVERY CENT FOR ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT AND HAS LITTLE TO SPARE FOR OTHERS. FOR WANT OF OBLIGATION AND BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC NEEDS, THIS THESIS CONTINUES, ABILITY OF USSR TO COME TO ASSISTANCE OF THIRD

WORLD IS THEREFORE NOT WITHOUT LIMITS. NEVERTHELESS, USSR CONFIDENTIAL

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DOES PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY TO THOSE STATES WHO WISH TO COOPERATE. NATURALLY, THIS AID IS PRIMARILY INTENDED TO BUILD UP THE "STATE SECTOR" IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH UNSTATED, THE SOVIETS TELL US WITHOUT

ANY UNDUE EMBARRASSMENT THAT THEIR AID IS EARMARKED TO SUPPORT SOVIET NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. THESE, HOWEVER, MAY VARY OR FLUCTUATE ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES. A NECESSARY COROLLARY OF THIS DOCTRINE OF LIMITED BUT CLEARLY TARGETED AID IS THAT IT BE MAINLY DISTRIBUTED THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS. SOVIETS ALSO ARE NOT RELUCTANT TO TELL US PRIVATELY THAT THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IMPACT OF SOVIET AID CONTRIBUTION LOST IN A WASH OF MULTILATERAL AID, THE DIRECTION OF WHICH THEY CANNOT FULLY CONTROL. THE COMPELLING SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE PRECIOUS RESOURCES, WITHOUT A CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGIC TARGET, ALSO RESPONDS TO A DEEP-SEATED POPULAR FEELING THAT CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME. IN THIS VEIN, THE SOVIET STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE (GOSPLAN) OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH GOSPLAN'S RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TOLD US THAT HE WAS GLAD TO BE REPRESENTING THE USSR AT MANILA WORLD FOOD COUNCIL MEETING (VICE SOVIET MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE) SINCE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR HIM TO AVOID ANY SOVIET COMMITMENT. SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MORE USABLE TO POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS, WHILE IT INVOLVES FEAR OF SLIDING TOWARDS CONVERTIBILITY, STRIKES US AS BASICALLY A PLOY TO LIMIT THE DRAIN ON SOVIET RESOURCES TOWARDS OBJECTIVES OUTSIDE SOVIET CONTROL. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SPARING WITH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND ATTENTIVE TO DERIVING THE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FOR THE USSR FROM EVERY PIECE OF AID RENDERED.

3. SOVIET THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE PROSPECT THAT THEY COULD BE INDUCED TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FORA SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK. NOT ONLY  
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DO THEY REGARD THESE INSTITUTIONS AS UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL, BUT THEY ALSO ENTERTAIN A PERHAPS UNREASONABLE FEAR THAT THEIR OWN MEMBERSHIP WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ERODING THE PROTECTIVE WALL OF THEIR OWN NON-CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY. ALTHOUGH SOME SOVIET LEADERS DO TOY FROM TIME TO TIME WITH HERETICAL THOUGHTS OF IMF MEMBERSHIP, THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF OPINION IS AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN THAT THE NON-CONVERTIBLE RUBLE AND ITS MYTHICAL VARIANT, THE SO-CALLED TRANSFERABLE RUBLE, AND SUCH UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE WESTERN CREDIT FACILITIES AS IS NECESSARY, ARE FULLY ADEQUATE TO COVER ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL NEEDS IN THE FINANCIAL AREA. CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT

WITH SOVIET LEADERS SELDOM GET PAST THESE TWO POINTS - AMERICAN DOMINATION AND LACK OF SOVIET NEED. BUT BEHIND THEM PROBABLY STANDS THE SUSPICION THAT CONVERTIBILITY WOULD BE DOWN THE ROAD FROM MEMBERSHIP, AND AFTER THAT WOULD COME THE EVILS OF SPONTANEITY AND CONSUMER SOVEREIGN-

TY, ERODING AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYING THE ROLE OF THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT TO PLAN AND DECIDE WHAT WILL BE PRODUCED AND WHAT CONSUMED. SINCE THE REALITY IS PROBABLY NOT NEARLY SO STARK AS THIS SOVIET FEAR, THE SUBJECT IS THEORETICALLY OPEN TO DISCUSSION, BUT IN PRACTICE WE FIND FEW RESPONSIBLE PERSONS HERE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WILL SOON CHANGE.

4. IN ADDITION TO SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO BECOME ENGAGED, ON THE ABOVE GROUNDS, WE SEE TOO LITTLE WILLINGNESS ON THEIR PART TO RECOGNIZE A STAKE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVEN WHERE THEIR EXPERTS DO PERCEIVE SUCH AN INTEREST, THEIR VOICE IS LIKELY TO BE OVERRULED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY MAINLY ATTUNED TO THE SPIRIT OF CUTTHROAT COMPETITION WITH THE WEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE THIRD WORLD. WE WERE STRUCK, BUT NOT SURPRISED, TO NOTE THAT IN THE MOST RECENT LAW OF THE SEA SESSION (STATE A3095) THE SOVIETS CAME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF MORE RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON SEABED PRODUCTION. "THE SOVIET UNION BLOCKED ANY U.S. ATTEMPTS TO FIND COMPROMISE. IT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAVE NEGOTIATED A BETTER TEXT WITH THE LDC'S IF THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN SILENT. HOWEVER, ONE MEMBER OF THEIR DELEGATION TOLD US THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY THE POLITBURO AND WAS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE." WHILE SUCH AN OUTCOME MIGHT NOT INVARIABLY OCCUR IN OTHER FORA, WE BELIEVE IT INDICATIVE OF HOW THE SOVIET DECISION WOULD FALL ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHERE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXACERBATING THIRD PARTY. SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH THE CASE IS LESS CLEAR CUT, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN CONSISTENT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OPEC PRICE INCREASES, WHILE TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE MODERATING INFLUENCE SAUDI ARABIA, IS DUE MAINLY TO THEIR DESIRE TO EXPLOIT WESTERN DIFFERENCES WITH THE LDC'S (IT IS TRUE THAT THE USSR, AS AN OIL EXPORTER, CURRENTLY BENEFITS FROM HIGHER WORLD PRICES, BUT ITS ROLE AS SUPPLIER IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND IN ANY CASE CAUSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S EASTERN EUROPEAN BRETHREN.)

5. DESPITE THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH WE BELIEVE MILITATE AGAINST ANY GENERAL US EFFORT TO TRY TO ENGAGE THE USSR IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND INSTITUTIONS, WE WOULD WELCOME A CAREFULLY ORGANIZED AND WELL TARGETED EFFORT TO SEEK SOVIET PARTICIPATION ON A SELECTIVE BASIS.

IN SOME WORLD ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS ALREADY REPRESENTED AND IN WHICH THE POLITICAL ASPECT IS RELATIVELY SUBDUED - PERHAPS WHO - WE CAN LOSE LITTLE BY ENCOURAGING CLOSER COOPERATION. ANOTHER AREA WHERE OBVIOUSLY SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE BENEFI-

CIAL IS MULTILATERAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (MCA),  
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ESPECIALLY THOSE IN WHICH USG IS MOST INTERSTED SUCH AS GRAIN AND SUGAR. WITH SOVIET CHAIRING THE IWA NEXT YEAR, THEIR POWER TO EFFECT MCA WHEAT NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE IGNORED. WITH REGARD TO OTHER MCA POSSIBILITIES BEING INDIVIDUALLY CONSIDERED UNDER THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR COMMODITIES, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE SOVIET PARTICIPATION BY INCLUDING THEM IN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON A COMMODITY BY COMMODITY BASIS WHEN IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO DO SO. EVEN IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO HELP HAS NOT BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING, WE CAN ENCOURAGE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO PUT DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO INCREASE THE SCALE AND FORM OF ITS PARTICIPATION TOWARDS MUTUALLY AGREED OBJECTIVES.

6. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE ARE MOST ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF DRAWING ON THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF US-SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO TRY TO EST SOVIET INTEREST AND CAPABILITIES IN JOINT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS. IN THIS CONTEXT WE DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE HAS ALREADY BROACHED WITH THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF HEALTH THE POSSIBILITY OF A COLLATERAL EFFORT

ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ADMITTEDLY, THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MATTER IS BEING PURSUED BY HEW. A CURSORY EXAMINATION OF THE TOTALITY OF OUR AGREEMENTS SUGGEST A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE CAPABILITIES WHICH MIGHT COMPLEMENT A US PROGRAM IN AN LDC: FOR EXAMPLE, SEISMIC RESEARCH, TSUANAMI PREDICTION, INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL SEARCH (LAKE AND ESTUARY, FISH STOCKS, IRRIGATION) POWER TRANSMISSION AND GENERATION AND SOME AREAS OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH. IF THE DEPARTMENT WERE INTERESTED IN PURSUING  
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THIS APPROACH, IT MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH INTERESTED USG TECHNICAL AGENCIES, WITH AN EYE TO COMING UP WITH SOME PROJECTS WE COULD PROPOSE TO THE USSR DURING JOINT COMMISSION MEETINGS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR.

7. IN THE CASE OF A BILATERAL PROJECT OF THIS NATURE, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFULLY SELECTIVE AS TO THE LDC OR LDC'S INVOLVED. A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE USSR WOULD HARDLY BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR US IN THOSE LDC'S HAVING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE US, UNLESS THERE WERE OVER-

WHELMING OFFSETTING TECHNICAL BENEFITS. PRESUMABLY, THE USSR WOULD BE EQUALLY CHARY IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE IT ENJOYS RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF POLITICAL SYMPATHIES. IN ANY CASE THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO REASSURE THEMSELVES THAT ANY BILATERAL PROJECT IS FREE OF THE SLIGHTEST HINT OF "HUMAN RIGHTS" INVOLVEMENT.

8. IN SUM, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS AGAINST DEVOTING MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL TO AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE SOVIETS IN MULTILATERAL FORA ON NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, EXCEPT IN CAREFULLY SELECTED CASES. SOVIETS ARE NOT INCLINED TO PARTICIPATE AND, EVEN IF THEY DID, WOULD PROBABLY NOT DIRECT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN CHANNELS WE WOULD WELCOME. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE LDC'S TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THEM TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND SIMPLIFY THE FORM OF THEIR AID COMMITMENTS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DEVIATE FROM THEIR PREFERRED POLICY OF CONCENTRATING AID ON KEY TARGETS

THROUGH BILATERAL MEANS. OUR BEST HOPE FOR ELICITING PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH USSR TOWARDS LDC'S LIES THROUGH USE OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, WHERE SOME LOW PROFILE COOPERATION MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IF SOVIETS SHOW INTEREST AND RIGHT LDC'S CAN BE FOUND.

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9. IF DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES NO OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE REPEATED TO US MISSION NATO AND EE POSTS. TOON UNQUOTE. YY CHRISTOPHER

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ORIGIN IO-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /004 R

66011  
DRAFTED BY:IO/ML:MARTIN JACOBS  
APPROVED BY:IO - PAUL BUNGE  
-----000698 231027Z /16

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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 295057

FOL SECSTATE 295057 SENT ACTION ANKARA ATHENS BERN BONN BRUSSELS  
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SOFIA DEC 10, 1977 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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COMMITTEE (GOSPLAN) OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH GOSPLAN'S RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TOLD US THAT HE WAS GLAD TO BE REPRESENTING THE USSR AT MANILA WORLD FOOD COUNCIL MEETING (VICE SOVIET MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE) SINCE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR HIM TO AVOID ANY SOVIET COMMITMENT. SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MORE USABLE TO POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS, WHILE IT INVOLVES FEAR OF SLIDING TOWARDS CONVERTIBILITY, STRIKES US AS BASICALLY A PLOY TO LIMIT THE DRAIN ON SOVIET RESOURCES TOWARDS OBJECTIVES OUTSIDE SOVIET CONTROL. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SPARING WITH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND ATTENTIVE TO DERIVING THE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FOR THE USSR FROM EVERY PIECE OF AID RENDERED.

3. SOVIET THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE PROSPECT THAT THEY COULD BE INDUCED TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FORA SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK. NOT ONLY DO THEY REGARD THESE INSTITUTIONS AS UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL, BUT THEY ALSO ENTERTAIN A PERHAPS UNREASONABLE FEAR THAT THEIR OWN MEMBERSHIP WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ERODING THE PROTECTIVE WALL OF THEIR OWN NON-CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY. ALTHOUGH SOME SOVIET LEADERS DO TOY FROM TIME TO TIME WITH HERETICAL THOUGHTS OF IMF MEMBERSHIP, THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF OPINION IS AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN THAT THE NON-CONVERTIBLE RUBLE AND ITS MYTHICAL VARIANT, THE SO-CALLED

TRANSFERABLE RUBLE, AND SUCH UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE WESTERN CREDIT FACILITIES AS IS NECESSARY, ARE FULLY ADEQUATE TO COVER ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL NEEDS IN THE FINANCIAL AREA. CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT

WITH SOVIET LEADERS SELDOM GET PAST THESE TWO POINTS - AMERICAN DOMINATION AND LACK OF SOVIET NEED. BUT BEHIND THEM PROBABLY STANDS THE SUSPICION THAT CONVERTIBILITY WOULD BE DOWN THE ROAD FROM MEMBERSHIP, AND AFTER THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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WOULD COME THE EVILS OF SPONTANEITY AND CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY, ERODING AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYING THE ROLE OF THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT TO PLAN AND DECIDE WHAT WILL BE PRODUCED AND WHAT CONSUMED. SINCE THE REALITY IS PROBABLY NOT NEARLY SO STARK AS THIS SOVIET FEAR, THE SUBJECT IS THEORETICALLY OPEN TO DISCUSSION, BUT IN PRACTICE WE FIND FEW RESPONSIBLE PERSONS HERE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WILL SOON CHANGE.

4. IN ADDITION TO SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO BECOME ENGAGED, ON THE ABOVE GROUNDS, WE SEE TOO LITTLE WILLINGNESS ON THEIR PART TO RECOGNIZE A STAKE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVEN WHERE THEIR EXPERTS DO PERCEIVE SUCH AN INTEREST, THEIR VOICE IS LIKELY TO BE OVERRULED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY MAINLY ATTUNED TO THE SPIRIT OF CUTTHROAT COMPETITION WITH THE WEST FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE THIRD WORLD. WE WERE STRUCK, BUT NOT SURPRISED, TO NOTE THAT IN THE MOST RECENT LAW OF THE SEA SESSION (STATE A3095) THE SOVIETS CAME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF MORE RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON SEABED PRODUCTION. "THE SOVIET UNION BLOCKED ANY U.S. ATTEMPTS TO FIND COMPROMISE. IT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAVE NEGOTIATED A BETTER TEXT WITH THE LDC'S IF THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN SILENT. HOWEVER, ONE MEMBER OF THEIR DELEGATION TOLD US THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY THE POLITBURO AND WAS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE." WHILE SUCH AN OUTCOME MIGHT NOT INVARIABLY OCCUR IN OTHER FORA, WE BELIEVE IT INDICATIVE OF HOW THE SOVIET DECISION WOULD FALL ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHERE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXACERBATING THIRD PARTY. SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH THE CASE IS LESS CLEAR CUT, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN CONSISTENT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OPEC PRICE INCREASES, WHILE TRYING TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENTIAL

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THE MODERATING INFLUENCE SAUDI ARABIA, IS DUE MAINLY TO THEIR DESIRE TO EXPLOIT WESTERN DIFFERENCES WITH THE LDC'S (IT IS TRUE THAT THE USSR, AS AN OIL EXPORTER, CURRENTLY BENEFITS FROM HIGHER WORLD PRICES, BUT ITS ROLE AS

SUPPLIER IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND IN ANY CASE CAUSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S EASTERN EUROPEAN BRETHREN.)

5. DESPITE THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH WE BELIEVE MILITATE AGAINST ANY GENERAL US EFFORT TO TRY TO ENGAGE THE USSR IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND INSTITUTIONS, WE WOULD WELCOME A CAREFULLY ORGANIZED AND WELL TARGETED EFFORT TO SEEK SOVIET PARTICIPATION ON A SELECTIVE BASIS.

IN SOME WORLD ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS ALREADY REPRESENTED AND IN WHICH THE POLITICAL ASPECT IS RELATIVELY SUBDUED - PERHAPS WHO - WE CAN LOSE LITTLE BY ENCOURAGING CLOSER COOPERATION. ANOTHER AREA WHERE OBVIOUSLY SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IS MULTILATERAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (MCA), ESPECIALLY THOSE IN WHICH USG IS MOST INTERESTED SUCH AS GRAIN AND SUGAR. WITH SOVIET CHAIRING THE IWA NEXT YEAR, THEIR POWER TO EFFECT MCA WHEAT NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE IGNORED. WITH REGARD TO OTHER MCA POSSIBILITIES BEING INDIVIDUALLY CONSIDERED UNDER THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR COMMODITIES, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE SOVIET PARTICIPATION BY INCLUDING THEM IN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON A COMMODITY BY COMMODITY BASIS WHEN IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO DO SO. EVEN IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO HELP HAS NOT BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING, WE CAN ENCOURAGE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO PUT DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO INCREASE THE SCALE AND FORM OF ITS PARTICIPATION TOWARDS MUTUALLY AGREED OBJECTIVES.

6. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE ARE MOST ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF DRAWING ON THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF US-SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO TRY TO EST SOVIET INTEREST AND CAPABILITIES  
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IN JOINT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS. IN THIS CONTEXT WE DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE HAS ALREADY BROACHED WITH THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF HEALTH THE POSSIBILITY OF A COLLATERAL EFFORT

ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ADMITTEDLY, THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MATTER IS BEING PURSUED BY HEW. A CURSORY EXAMINATION OF THE TOTALITY OF OUR AGREEMENTS SUGGEST A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE CAPABILITIES WHICH MIGHT COMPLEMENT A US PROGRAM IN AN LDC: FOR EXAMPLE, SEISMIC RESEARCH, TSUANAMI PREDICTION, INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL SEARCH (LAKE AND ESTUARY, FISH STOCKS, IRRIGATION) POWER TRANSMISSION AND GENERATION AND SOME AREAS OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH. IF THE DEPARTMENT WERE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS APPROACH, IT MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH INTERESTED USG

TECHNICAL AGENCIES, WITH AN EYE TO COMING UP WITH SOME PROJECTS WE COULD PROPOSE TO THE USSR DURING JOINT COMMISSION MEETINGS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR.

7. IN THE CASE OF A BILATERAL PROJECT OF THIS NATURE, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFULLY SELECTIVE AS TO THE LDC OR LDC'S INVOLVED. A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE USSR WOULD HARDLY BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR US IN THOSE LDC'S HAVING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE US, UNLESS THERE WERE OVER-

WHELMING OFFSETTING TECHNICAL BENEFITS. PRESUMABLY, THE USSR WOULD BE EQUALLY CHARY IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE IT ENJOYS RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF POLITICAL SYMPATHIES. IN ANY CASE THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO REASSURE THEMSELVES THAT ANY BILATERAL PROJECT IS FREE OF THE SLIGHTEST HINT  
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OF "HUMAN RIGHTS" INVOLVEMENT.

8. IN SUM, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS AGAINST DEVOTING MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL TO AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE SOVIETS IN MULTILATERAL FORA ON NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, EXCEPT IN CAREFULLY SELECTED CASES. SOVIETS ARE NOT INCLINED TO PARTICIPATE AND, EVEN IF THEY DID, WOULD PROBABLY NOT DIRECT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN CHANNELS WE WOULD WELCOME. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE LDC'S TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THEM TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND SIMPLIFY THE FORM OF THEIR AID COMMITMENTS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DEVIATE FROM THEIR PREFERRED POLICY OF CONCENTRATING AID ON KEY TARGETS

THROUGH BILATERAL MEANS. OUR BEST HOPE FOR ELICITING PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH USSR TOWARDS LDC'S LIES THROUGH USE OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, WHERE SOME LOW PROFILE COOPERATION MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IF SOVIETS SHOW INTEREST AND RIGHT LDC'S CAN BE FOUND.

9. IF DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES NO OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE REPEATED TO US MISSION NATO AND EE POSTS. TOON UNQUOTE. CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE VANCE

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